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1.
Just before my chosen period, in 1797, in a booklet bearing the splendid title
Wissenschaftslehre, Johann Gottlieb Fichte observed, concerning the human
act of knowledge and its object,
act
object,
that basically there are only two philosophical positions. ' On the one hand you
can determine the object by means of the act, and, on the other hand, you can
determine the act by means of its object. In the first case you are an Idealist,
and in the second you are a Realist (Fichte, being an Idealist himself, used the
pejorative term Dogmatist), and never the two shall meet.
2.
My topic concerns inference, that is, acts of knowledge of a certain kind. An
inference is an
Urteilsfällung, die auf Grund schon früher gefällter Urteile nach logischen Geset-
zen vollzogen wird,
Frege held, for one.2
On this view, then, an act of inference is nothing but a mediate act of judge-
ment: in such an act new knowledge is obtained from previously known judge-
ments. Consider the completely general mode of inference (German: Schluss-
weise) I:
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J2
A mediate act of knowledge according to this mode of inference takes the
form (where the J\.... ,Jj are the judgements of the prior acts of knowledge):
J\
J.
In this Frege completely follows the epistemological tradition of his own and
previous times.
At the beginning of my period, the scholastic patrimony still held sway in
one form or other, for instance in Kant's Jäsche Logik. The following diagram
may serve as a convenient starting point for my exposition:
The Traditional Structure of Logic:
Operation of the
Intellect
I
Simple Apprehension
II
Judging,
Composition/Division
of two terms
HI
Reasoning,
Inferring
(Mental)
Product
Concept, Idea,
(Mental) Term
Judgement,
(Mental) Proposition:
5 is P
(Mental) Inference
(External)
Sign
(Written/spoken)
Term
Assertion,
(Written/spoken)
Proposition
(Written/spoken)
Inference, Reasoning
There is a hierarchical order among the logical faculties of the intellect. Even
though the third row is central to my topic, one has to deal also with the pre-
vious two, because inference makes use of judgements that are composed out
of terms. The first major change in this order was made by Kant who reversed
the order of priority between rows I and II:
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Wir können alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurückführen, so daßder
V e r s t a n d überhaupt als ein V e r m ö g e n zu ur te i l en vorgestellt
werden kann.4
We should also note that the application of the act-object/product imagery
after the fashion of the above diagram produces a tension in the traditional
scheme. There the product of an act of inferring is a (mental) inference. An
act of inference, however, is a mediate act of judgement, whence its object
is a judgement made and not a mental inference. This, 1 think, is right: the
primary product of an act of inferring is not an inference, but a judgement
made. To this extent the traditional picture in the diagram is misleading and it
is incumbent upon us to seek another home for the inferences.
Let me also take notice of some terminological matters. English is partic-
ularly rich in variants here: infer, illate, deduce, derive, and conclude may all
be used more or less interchangeably. For what it is worth, the correspond-
ing nouns seem to differ somewhat: a deduction, or derivation, might contain
many steps, whereas normally an inference is one step only, from premisses to
conclusion. A conclusion, on the other hand, is usually what is concluded and
not the act of concluding it. In German we have sckliessen, Schluss(weise) and
Schlusssatz for, respectively (act of) inferring, (mode of) inference and con-
clusion, as well as the splendid verb folgern with such cognates as Schlussfol-
gerung, etc.
3.
The first serious breach in the traditional logical fortress was broached by one
thoroughly steeped in the Scholastic patrimony, namely Bernard Bolzano, in
another Wissenschaftslehre from 1837. This, however, is no puny pamphlet,
but a monumental four-volume tome.5 Like all good ideas the basic idea be-
hind Bolzano's magisterial change is essentially simple: Bolzano revolution-
izes logical theory by "objectivizing" the middle column of the traditional
diagram. This objectivization consists in severing the left - and right-hand
links to mind and language, thereby obtaining objective "Platonist" logical
notions, for which Bolzano ironically adopts the Kantian 'an sich' idiom.
Thus, the (mental) terms become objective "ideas-in-themselves" (Vorstellun-
gen an sich).6 The judgements made, that is, the mental propositions, become
propositions-in-themselves (Sätze an sich), that is, propositions in the modem,
post-Russellian sense.7 Finally, the mental inferences are replaced by Ableit-
barkeiten, that is, relations of (logical) consequence between propositions-in-
themselves.
The resulting change with respect to the form of judgement is particularly
interesting. In place of the traditional bipartite Subject/copula/Predicate form
Bolzano uses the unary form
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C is true,
where C is a Satz an sich, that is, a proposition that serves as content of the
judgement in question (WL §34).8 The form of the proposition C, on the other
hand, stays close to the traditional [S is P\. Bolzano uses [A has b], where
A and b are Vorstellungen an sich, that is, {what corresponds to) objectiviza-
tions of the mental products of simple apprehensions, as canonical form for
the objective propositions. Thus, he converts the traditional form of judgement
into a form of content:
The proposition that the rose has redness is true
instead of
The rose is red.
Why Bolzano made this change in the form of judgement is not clear to me.
That he wanted to give a foundation for logic is clear and also that he gave
this in terms of objective propositions. I can offer the following argument.
As Frege noted, assertion is the linguistic counterpart to judging.9 Normally
I assert by uttering a declarative sentence assertorically. Thus, for instance, by
uttering 'Snow is white' I assert that snow is white. Propositions, the contents
of judgements/assertions, on the other hand, are indicated by nominalized that-
clauses. Thus,
that snow is white
indicates the proposition that snow is white. However, by uttering solely 'that
snow is white' I cannot normally assert that snow is white. The nominalization
needs to be completed with
... is true
in order to get a declarative sentence that is behauptungsjahig, that is, can be
used to effect an assertion. Thus, a sole utterance of
that snow is white is true
can be used for effecting an assertion to the effect that snow is white, and so
we have reached {what I call) the Bolzano form of judgement. This argument,
to which I am quite partial myself, draws both upon language and judging,
whence it would have been rejected by Bolzano.
Perhaps we might use the term 'statement' for what declaratives express:
the nominalization of a declarative then stands for the proposition that serves
as content of the statement that the declarative expresses. This terminology
seems particularly apt in view of the legal use of statement for what is said by
a witness. It is on the level of assertions, but we might not wish to join in the
asserting thereof. The corresponding German term would be Aussage. This
distinction between judgement/assertion, statement and proposition cannot be
found in either Frege or Bolzano. Frege has only judgement and proposition,
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whereas Bolzano's Sätze an sich sometimes seem to serve as my statements
and sometimes as my propositions.
A judgement of the form [proposition C is true] is richtig (correct), and is
then said to be a piece of knowledge (an Erkenntnis), when the proposition C
really is true, Bolzano reduces the correctness ("truth") of a judgement to the
(prepositional) truth of its content (WL §36).
Under the Bolzano form of judgement, the form of inference I is trans-
formed into the form I';
A \ is true ^2 is true ... A/t is true
C is true
For Bolzano, such an inference f is valid when a relation of logical con-
sequence - eine Ableitbarkeit - obtains between the propositions that serve
as premisses, respectively conclusion, of the inference in question, that is,
when the consequence, or using current terminology introduced by Hertz and
Gentzen, sequent S:
holds "logically", and where such logical holding is explained in terms of
the familiar variation of non-logical sub-propositional parts that was used by
Bolzano in his Variationslogik.10
As we know, the consequence S holds logically precisely when the corre-
sponding implication
is a logical truth. In effect, we can say that Bolzano reduces the validity of
mode I' of inference to the logical truth of a certain proposition. The first
Bolzano-reduction reduced the epistemic notion of correctness (Richtigkeit) to
the alethic notion of truth. This second Bolzano-reduction similarly reduces
an epistemic notion, namely inferential validity, to an alethic notion, albeit
a more complex one than prepositional truth. ' ' Also, it is much to Bolzano's
credit that, contrary to most later logical practitioners, his theory allows also
for material consequence (by considering variation with respect to a Vorstel-
lung that does not occur in the antecedents or in the succèdent). That is, the
sequent A =* B holds (materially) when the implication(al proposition) A D B
is true. In order to obtain the truth of the proposition B, it is enough to know the
judgement [A is true] and that the sequent A =*• B holds. The logical holding of
the sequent, that is, the preservation of truth under all variations of non-logical
sub-propositional parts, is not needed.
In my opinion, the magnitude and richness of Bolzano's achievement in the
foundations of logical theory can hardly be exaggerated.
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4.
About 35 years after Bolzano an alternative form of judgement was proposed
by another priest-philosopher steeped in the tradition, namely Franz Brentano.
Brentano used as his form(s)
a IS (exists)
as well as
a IS NOT (does not exist),
where a is a concept, or term.12 The four categorical judgements from the
tradition can be reduced to these forms. For instance,
No a are ß
can be expressed as
An a which is ß does not exist.
Later, during the first two decades of our century, Brentano came to reject his
earlier realist views in a series of brief writings that were posthumously pub-
lished in a volume with the splendid title Wahrheit undEvidenz}* In particular
he criticised the notion of a blind judgement and, contra Bolzano, we might
extend his criticism also to blind inference. Blindness of judgement (and in-
ference) is so called after Plato, Rep. 506c:
[...] opinions divorced from knowledge, are ugly things [...]. The best of them
are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some correct opinion without
evidence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?14
Under the above two Bolzano reductions, the correctness of judgements and in-
ferences depend solely on the truth-behaviour of propositions under variability
of suitable sub-propositional parts. A judgement is richtig, ist eine Erkenntnis,
in complete independence of whether we know it or not, depending solely on
whether its content is a true proposition or not, and similarly, an inference is
valid depending solely on whether the matching implication is a logical truth
or not. In no way does it depend on whether the conclusion drawn actually
is known, or whether it can be known from knowledge of the premisses, or
whether the premisses are knowable: the only thing that matters is whether
a certain implication is a logical truth. I for one share Brentano's misgivings
concerning the correctness of such blind judgement and inference; without
epistemological warrant the inference is not allowed.15
While I have to agree with Brentano concerning the blindness that results
through the Bolzano-reductions, 1 must put on the record that Brentano was
singularly ungenerous in his treatment of Bolzano:
Wenn ich unter solchen Umständen auf Bolzano aufmerksam machte, so geschah
dies, [...], keineswegs, um den jungen Leuten Boizano als Lehrer und Führer zu
empfehlen. Was sie von ihm, das dürfte ich mir sagen, konnten sie besser von
mir lernen [...]
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Und wie gesagt, wie ich selbst von Bolzano nie auch nur einen einzigen Satz
entnommen habe, so habe ich auch niemals meinen Schülern glaubhaft gemacht,
daß sie dort eine wahre Bereicherung ihrer philosophischen Erkenntnis gewin-
nen würden.
Brentano to Hugo Bergmann, June l, 1909.16
A spirit equally ungenerous might counter by observing that Brentano's fore-
most logical achievement, namely the reduction of the four kinds of categorical
judgement to his two kinds of existential judgement, can be found wholesale
already in Bolzano.17
5.
With respect to judgement Frege concurs with Bolzano. His formulation from
the famous essay Über Sinn und Bedeutung could not be more explicit:
Ein Urteil ist mir nicht das bloße Fassen eines Gedanken, sondern die Anerken-
nung seiner Wahrheit.'8
However, with respect to the notion of consequence between propositions
Frege represents a retrograde step in comparison with Bolzano. It does not
play a significant role in his writings.19
Frege's major innovation over and above Bolzano lies in his use of a bet-
ter form of content; his propositions (or "Thoughts") do not take the form
[A has b], but are of the form P(a), that is, function applied to argument. This
essentially mathematical notion Frege had readily available owing to his train-
ing. Most of his achievements can be seen to flow naturally from this basic
change, but to document this fully would take a course of lectures rather than
a section in one lecture.
THE REALIST (BOLZANO-FREGE) THEORY20
(1)
{content of object}
act of knowledge
(3)
4-
[{Proposition P(a}} is true]
t
(2) [object of the act]
= [asserted statement], [judgement known]
Michael Dummett's views on Frege and Wittgenstein can be summarised as
follows:
1) Wittgenstein is nearly always right, except when he disagrees with Frege.21
2) Frege is even more right, except when he is obviously wrong.
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According to Dummett, inference is one such topic where Frege is obviously
wrong:
Frege's account of inference allows no place for a[nj [... ] act of supposition.
Gentzen later had the highly successful idea of formalizing inference so as to
leave a place for the introduction of hypotheses [... ]
Indeed,
[i]t can be said of Gentzen that it was he who showed how proof theory should
be done.22
In particular, Frege's view that we can only draw inferences from true, nay,
known premisses has come in for much flak and even ridicule.23 I think, to the
contrary, that he was absolutely right, given his Aristotelian views on the use
of logic in demonstrations. Frege's uses logic to establish truths, mathematical
theorems. He is not concerned with the so-called logical truth of propositions,
but with how we obtain further knowledge by proceeding from theorem to
theorem.24 We do that by proceeding from known truths to a novel insight by
drawing a valid inference. This is consistently the practice in the Grundge-
seteze where every premiss of an inference is prefixed with the Urteilsstrich.
Thus premisses of inferences are asserted, and assertion effects a claim to
knowledge.
A mode of inference is valid, if the conclusion can be known, given that the
premisses are known. In the Begriffsschrift Frege spends a number of pages
showing that his primitive rules have this property. Inferential validity is not
preservation of truth, that is, the (possibly logical) holding of consequence -
between propositions - but the preservation of knowability from premiss state-
ments to conclusion statement.
6.
The remainder of my paper will largely be spent on an attempt to adjudicate
between Frege and Gentzen. This will take one more preliminary, though,
concerning truth. Frege, notoriously, held that truth is sui generis and inde-
finable.25 Towards the end of the first decade of the century G. E. Moore and
Bertrand Russell offered novel analyses of truth that made use of (various ver-
sions of) a so-called truth-maker analysis.26 These proceed by putting
proposition C is true = there exists a truth-maker for C.
Among the candidates for truth-makers we find facts, complexes and states
of affairs. The most celebrated truth-maker analysis is that of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus, where an atomic proposition C presents a Sachverhalt Sc such that
C is true iff Sc obtains (besteht),
where truth for complex propositions is obtained recursively from this atomic
case. Here the crucial notion of "obtaining" is ontologically primitive. The
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bivalence of the onto logical obtains induces bivalence for prepositional truth,
whence the logic is classical.
THE TRUTH-MAKER REDUCTION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S Tractatus
(2) {content of object}
(4)
- act of knowledge
4-
Sc obtains <-> [ {Proposition C] is true]
Î t
( 1 ) state of affairs [object of the act] (3)
= [asserted statement, statement known]
However, a truth-maker analysis is not committed to a realist stance. Accord-
ing to the intuitionist critique of classical semantics the quantifier laws are not
evident under the classical truth-value semantics. In other words, the legiti-
macy of V-formation is disputed for classical semantics. Since mathematics is
replete with quantifiers it is incumbent upon the constructivist to offer another
notion of proposition. This was implicit in Kronecker and Brouwer, and was
made explicit in the semantical writings of Brouwer's pupil Arend Heyting
during the thirties. With the benefit of hindsight, Heyting's work can be seen
as a truth-maker analysis:
proposition C is true = Proof(C) exists.
The notion of a proof of a proposition, or "proof-object" for short, is novel
with intuitionism; previously all proving had been at the level of judgements
and not at that of their contents.27 Furthermore, the notion of existence that
is at issue here is not that of realist "obtaining" or something similar. On
the contrary, it is the constructivist notion of existence, which was made fully
explicit by Hermann Weyl, who held that an existential judgement was only an
Urteilsabstrakt that had to be grounded in a real judgement, for instance:
construction c is a proof for proposition A.
Thus the form of judgement [C is true] is reduced back to a certain judgement
of the traditional [S is P] form; namely
c is a truth-maker for C.28
7.
With this apparatus I am now ready to treat of 'the great works' of Frege and
Gentzen. There is a crucial difference between Gentzen and the other logi-
cians treated of so far: Gentzen belongs to the period after the metamathe-
matical revolution. He received his logical training within the circle around
Hubert and so, strictly speaking, his formal languages are uninterpreted. Its
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formulae are (meta)mathematica! objects of study to be spoken about, rather
than by means of, and he belongs to Jean van Heijenoort's paradigm of logic
as calculus, whereas the previous logicians all belong to the earlier paradigm
of logic as language.29 According to Dummett it was Gentzen who showed
how proof theory should be done. The proper evaluation of this claim depends
strongly on how to interpret "proof theory". Three readings suggest them-
selves: (i) a formal machinery that induces a "syntactic" consequence relation
for an uninterpreted formalism, and which ideally has to coincide with that de-
termined by a certain given formal semantics, (ii) contribution(s) to the Hubert
programme, and (iii) that branch of epistemology that treats of demonstrative
knowledge. With respect to the first two readings Dummett is certainly right.
However, when our aim is a comparison with Frege, reading (iii) is the relevant
one.
Frege's system was an interpreted one; a well-formed formula in the Be-
griffsschrift does express a proposition in virtue of being a name of a truth-
value.30 Thus, in order to carry out a fair comparison, the basic notions of
Gentzen's system must be supplied with careful meaning-explanations con-
verting the formulae into propositions. In particular, if we are going to convert
his (meta)mathematical production-systems for strings of (meta)mathematical
objects into a meaningful language, not only the terms and formulae should
be interpreted; also the derivation trees should be assigned semantic values.
Finally, corresponding to Frege's use of the Urteilsstrich, an account must be
given at the pragmatic level of the notion of an assertion and how it interacts
with that of assumption.
Gentzen actually gave two formulations of his natural deduction systems
that incorporate the idea of assumptions in different ways. First there is the
standard variant from his 1933 Göttingen dissertation.31 Here the derivable
objects are formulae, which may depend on certain assumptions, and several
rules serve to discharge such open assumptions. A derivation thus takes the
general form:
Ai, A2, At,
D:
C.
The other form, from the first consistency-proof, makes use of Sequenzen,
which German term is translated into English as sequents?2 Why Gentzen left
out Kon is a mystery to me; he took his term and the notion from the earlier
works of Paul Hertz, but surely the sequents are consequence(-relation)s. The
sequent A\ ,Ai,... ,A>.=S-C should be read:
C is true, when A\ ,A^... ,Ak are true.
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This rendering, which is taken from Oentzen's first publication (on Hertz's sys-
tems) could have been offered by Bolzano.33 A variant reading of the sequent
is:
C is true under the assumptions AI ,A-i,... ,<4fr.34
In the 1936 version of Natural Deduction the derivable objects are sequents and
the derivation trees start, not with assumptions, but with axioms of the form
A => A, which correspond to the making of assumptions in the 1933 version.35
Let us consider his arithmetical language: I grant Dummett that if we treat
it as an interpreted language, rather than as an uninterpreted object of study
(Hubert calculus), we obtain mathematical propositions. How should the der-
ivation trees be interpreted? One problem with standard predicate-calculus
languages, such as that of Gentzen, is that the well-formed formulae do double
duty. They serve as formalistic simulacra for two notions, namely mathemat-
ical propositions and theorems proved, that is, judgements known; on the one
hand, they are what composite formulae are built from, that is, prepositional
analogues, and, on the other hand, they are what is derived by proof trees, that
is, the analogues of theorems. An attempt to redress this using force indicators
of the same kind as Frege's Urteilsstrich rapidly gets into trouble. Consider
the following example D :
B.
This example is well known from one of Dag Prawitz's "reductions": the im-
plication A D B has been introduced and is immediately eliminated again.36
The minor premiss of the 3 E is the formula A. In an interpreted calculus this
has to be an assertion whereas the implication antecedent A in the major pre-
miss of the D E is neither asserted nor assumed.37 It constitutes no problem,
however, since it occurs as a prepositional part of the major premiss, which,
as a whole, is asserted. The assumption formula A, on the other hand, is as-
sumed; so perhaps we might make do with one assumption indicator and one
assertion indicator. If we consider the premiss of the D I, however, stalemate
results. It is certainly not asserted outright, nor is it assumed, so how should it
be interpreted? First, we begin by taking seriously that what is asserted are not
propositions, but statements. The formulae are propositions. Appending
(is) true
to a proposition A produces a statement
A true.
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The result is a tree £>":
Göran Sundholm
3 B true true
B true.
With the assumption formula A, and the formula B that depends on it, we are
at a loss. Consequently, in Gentzen derivations, what in general is ascribed to
the conclusion formulae of derivation trees is not truth outright, but dependent
truth:
... is true, given that the assumptions A\,A2, . . . ,A/c are true, or
. . . true (A i true, AI true, ... ,A^ true)
for short.
The diagram can then be completed into ZX":
A true (A true) |
I I
B true (A true)
A3 B true A true
B true.
Here we infer the categorical truth of the implication A3 B from the depen-
dent truth of the proposition B. Remark further that all statements, also those
ascribing dependent truth to propositions, are asserted here. "The assumption
of A" corresponds to an assertion that A is true, dependent on the truth of A.
This tree O", however, is not the original Gentzen proof-tree. In particular, the
assumptions have disappeared.
The original, unadorned, proof tree D', we can say, then shows the truth
of the proposition B in virtue of being a notation for a proofl[-object) for the
proposition B. In fact, the whole diagram can best be read as
Dl is a proof of the proposition B.
The 1936 version, on the other hand, when interpreted, has to have a novel
form of judgement, namely
sequent S holds.
This is a most natural generalisation of the form of judgement
proposition A is true
in that we demand a verification also here. In order to have the right to assert
that 5 holds I must have a function ƒ such that when a\ is a proof of A\,... ^a^
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is a proof of Ak, then f(a\ — , a/,) is a proof of C. In particular, we must note
that the three statements
A D B true, which demands a proof-object formed by D I,
B true (A true), which demands a dependent proof-object b : B, given that
x : A, and
A => B holds, which demands a function ƒ : (A)B,
are equivalent (that is, when one is correct, so are the other two), but they
differ in meaning, of course, since their respective assertion-conditions are
different.38
The 1933 derivations, when interpreted, become (dependent) proof-objects
for propositions. What about the 1936 derivation trees? When a mathemati-
cian proves a theorem, he obtains an object of knowledge, namely the theorem
proved, but he also leaves a trace.39 This may have a subjective, and often
physical, character: coffee cups, scrap paper, cigarette stubs, or what have
you. This trace will not enable us to demonstrate the theorem ourselves. An-
other kind of trace, though, is a carefully written out blue-print for how to
proceed in order to demonstrate the theorem. Traces of this kind are pub-
lished in mathematical texts and are commonly called proofs, or demonstra-
tions. The derivations in the (1936) sequential formulation of Natural De-
duction are such blueprints for acts that demonstrate their conclusion state-
ments.
Finally, then, what about Dummett on Gentzen and Frege? Is he right?
Bolzano had a splendid theory of consequence, whereas Frege was more right
about inference than he is given credit for. However, only with Gentzen (1936)
do we get a formulation of logic that does equal justice to alethic consequence
among propositions as well as to epistemic inference from judgements) to
judgement. Thus, strictly speaking, Dummett was right in what he said, but
he was wrong in what he meant; the use of assumption formulae does not
convince in a fair comparison with Frege.
Notes
1. Fichte (1797).
2. Frege (1906, p. 387) (My) English translation An inference is an "Act of judgement which is
made, according to logical laws, on the basis of judgements already made.'L
3. The diagram is based on a similar one in Mantain ( 1946, p. 6), but is reasonably standard. Mantam's
source, and also thai of other Neo-Thornists, is the splendid Ars Logica by John of St. Thomas.
4. KrV A69 (My) English translation "All operations of the intellect can be reduced to judgements,
so that in general the intellect can be seen as a capacity for judging."
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5. Possibly Bolzano wanted to demonstrate, by means of an exampJe, what a proper, realist Wis-
senschaftstehre should be in reaction to the earlier idealist effort of Fichte. The latter, however, is hardly
mentioned in Bolzano's severely realist treatise and Kant is the only idealist foe worthy of. Bolzano's expo-
sition has surely benefited from the fortuitous circumstance that it could be developed in adversity to a (the)
major idealist philosopher of the age. This is brought out is sharp relief when one compares the early realist
writings of Moore and Russell with the depîh and width of the pellucid Wissenschaftslehre: their idealist
adversaries were Bradley, Bosanquet, Green, and Joachim.
6 To my mind this unfortunate terminology - Vorstellung an sick - comes close to a contradictio in
adiecto.
I. Russell (Î903, Appendix A) might be responsible for sanctioning the unfortunate use of the term
proposition for the Fregean Gedanken.
8. In the discussion after my Cracow lecture. Wolfgang Künne objected to my ascribing the [propo-
sition A is true] form of judgement to Bolzano Könne is certainly right in that all of A, A is true, \A is
true] is true, [[A is true] is true] is true, etc., are propositions (rather than judgements), which observation
constitutes the basis for Bolzano's "proof" that there are infinitely many different truths (WL $32). Indeed,
in §35 Bolzano slates that 'jedes Urtheil auch ein Satz ist'. So every judgement is a proposition, but as tt
also a proposition-in-itself? My reading is certainly compatible with §36, where we find: 'ein jedes UrtheiL
das einen wahren Satz enthält', that is. every judgement that contains a true proposition (my emphasis). So
on that reading the judgement would be a mental or linguistic statement that a proposition is true, and it is
correct if the proposition whose truth is stated actually is a truth.
9. (1918, p. 62). The key observation on which my argument is based can be found in Frege (1892,
p. 35), but it is used for another purpose there.
10 Lack of space, and the level of abstraction at which I want to move, prevents me from doing full
justice to Bolzano here on al least three scores: (i) I ignore the demand of compatibility that he imposes
on the antecedents in consequence relations; (li) I leave out the relation of Abfolge, with its concomitant
grounding proof-trees (§220), and (iii) I do not treat of the intricate elaboration concerning the "mediation"
(Vermittlung') of judgements (§300.7)
I1. In this Bolzano was followed by virtually the entire modem tradition in classical logic. Similar
accounts of validity can be found in Wittgenstein's Tractates, in Ajdukiewicz (1934), as well as in the
writings of Quine, just to mention some out of many, many places.
12. Brentano presented his theory in lectures at Wurzburg 1870-1, and repeatedly until 1895 at Vienna
13. Brentano (1930).
14.1 am indebted îo Per Martin-Lof for drawing my attention to this passage
15. (1930, IV:4,pp. 140-143).
16. Bergmann (1966, pp. 307-308).
17. Berg (1962, p. 55) lists the relevant WL passages
18. (1892, p. 34): 'A judgement is not the mere grasping of a Thought, but the recognition of its truth.'
In Bs p. 2 and p 4 the suggeslion is made that the form of judgement is [ .. ist eine Thatsache]^ where
the blank has to be filled with an "UmstawT. Thus the form of the judgement made through an assertoric
utterance of 'Snow is white' is [The circumstance that snow is white is a fact]. In place of circumstance,
Frege also allows for '"Salz" In (1918, p. 74) he identifies fact with true Thought, which yields the final
reformulation [The proposition that snow is white is true].
19. Note, though, that an iterated Frege-conditional can equally well be read as a Bolzano-Gentzen
sequent (which expresses a consequence relation between propositions). This has recently been remarked
by Franz von Kutschera and Peter Schröder-Heister However, the point was made with maximum clanty
already by Pavel Tichy ( 1988, p. 252). A notion close to Bolzano's formale Abfolge is found in Frege (1906,
1H). In my (2000) I suggest that this is no accident, but that Frege actually read Bolzano in 1905/06.
20. The numerals within brackets indicate the order of conceptual priority of the notions and their re-
spective correctness-notions truth of content correctness of the product, and lightness of the act. For
Bolzano and Frege, the truth of propositions as the key notion of logic.
21 Dummett(1981,p. 33).
22 Dummetl (1973, p. 309 and p. 435, respectively).
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23. For a more balanced view, as well as references to Frege, see Currie (1987).
24. As far as I know, logical truth occurs only in {1923, p. 50), the very latest of Frege's articles, and
then only as a result of Frege's struggles with Wittgenstein's Tradatus.
25. (1918, p 60)
26. For terminology and background, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith ( 1984).
27. Concerning proof-objects and their use in constructive semantics, see my (1983), (1993), and
(2000a)
28. Documentation for the claims of this section can be found in a number of my papers, for example,
(1994), (1997), and (1999)
29. See my (1999, pp 140-141) for a discussion of the Van Heijenoort paradigm from the present
perspective.
30. Or would have done so, had Frege's semantical elaboration in §§ 29-31 of the Grundgesetze actu-
ally worked Dummett as trivially right if we take the inconsistency of Frege's system into account; that,
however, was not the point at issue but the proper way of keeping the books of logical deduction.
31. Published as (1934-35).
32. (1936)
33. (1932, p. 320).
34. (1936, p. 512).
35. Dutnmett's (1977, Ch 4) exposition of normalization and other matters actually uses the (1936)
formulation of Natural Deduction.
36. (1965, p. 37).
37. For this "Frege point", see Geach (1965).
38 All three statements, it should be noted, are refuted by the same counterexample, namely a pair of
proof-objects for A and -*B, respectively
39. I owe the notion of trace to Per Martin-Lof. II is treated of at some length in my ( 1993) and (2000a).
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